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The Solution to Science’s Replication Crisis
Bruce Knuteson∗
The solution to science’s replication crisis is a new ecosystem in which scientists sell what they
learn from their research. In each pairwise transaction, the information seller makes (loses) money
if he turns out to be correct (incorrect). Responsibility for the determination of correctness is
delegated, with appropriate incentives, to the information purchaser. Each transaction is brokered
by a central exchange, which holds money from the anonymous information buyer and anonymous
information seller in escrow, and which enforces a set of incentives facilitating the transfer of useful,
bluntly honest information from the seller to the buyer. This new ecosystem, capitalist science,
directly addresses socialist science’s replication crisis by explicitly rewarding accuracy and penalizing
inaccuracy.
The problematic incentives within socialist science that have led to socialist science’s replication
crisis are too embedded to remove. Those seeking accurate knowledge to inform important, high
stakes decisions will gradually start to rely on capitalist science, which penalizes the selling of
information that turns out to be wrong. Researchers with genuinely valuable information will
choose to sell it rather than publish it away for free. The most useful, interesting, and accurate
information will therefore gradually move from the ecosystem of socialist science to the ecosystem
of capitalist science, where it is properly valued.
Capitalist science is the solution to socialist science’s replication crisis.
I. SOCIALIST SCIENCE
Drug company Q reads a scholarly article in a distin-
guished journal authored by academic A. Motivated in
significant part by A’s findings, Q starts a new research
effort in this seemingly promising direction.
One year and one million dollars later, Q realizes A’s
findings are basically wrong [1–15].
Variants of this story may be invoked by a convenient
buzz phrase: science’s “replication crisis,” “replicability
crisis,” or “reproducibility crisis.” Q is not always a drug
company. A is usually an academic.
Q, the sucker in this story, realizes he is continually
getting shafted [16–24]. Systematic attempts to repeat
many published studies fail [25–30], spreading awareness
to the masses and stoking discontent. Debates erupt over
the scale of the problem [31–38]. Some hope extermina-
tion of psychology departments will be sufficient [39–46].
Others work to re(de)fine the notion of “replication” [47–
49]. Incremental improvements to the current system are
proposed [50–90] [163]. Most are never enacted [91]. The
rest have limited impact [92–104].
The incentive structures contributing to the replication
crisis are observed to be deeply entrenched features of the
ecosystem within which science is done [105–136] and
subsequently applied [137–148]. This ecosystem com-
prises institutions (including funding agencies, industry,
universities, and academic journals), culture, accepted
practice (including procedures by which grant money is
awarded, articles published, promotions granted, and ac-
colades bestowed), and the bureaucracy required to sup-
port all of these. The ecosystem is complex, multifaceted,
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and not easily changed. The incentive structures con-
tributing to the replication crisis are, similarly, not eas-
ily changed. A timely solution to the replication crisis
probably requires a new ecosystem.
For convenience, we refer to the current ecosys-
tem [149] – funded by taxpayers, with published results
available to all citizens – as socialist science [164] [165].
II. CAPITALIST SCIENCE
Perhaps we can construct a different ecosystem.
Lacking imagination, we look to see what other pro-
fessions do. Many professions exhibit a very interesting
behavior. There occur pairwise transactions, in which
one party sells something of value to another party. One
party (A) gives something of value to some other party
(Q). In return, Q gives A something called money.
Perhaps our academic (A) can sell what he learns to
those (Q) who find A’s information valuable. Many deep
pocketed industries, including the pharmaceutical indus-
try, make high stakes decisions motivated by academic
research. A should have little difficulty finding customers
Q.
To incentivize accuracy, we need some sort of trans-
action that causes A to lose money if he turns out to
be wrong. We therefore need transactions for which the
(in)accuracy of A’s information can eventually be objec-
tively determined, and we need a reliable, low-cost pro-
cedure for making that determination.
Suppose Q has a specific question and is willing to pay
for a useful answer. Q can ensure the usefulness of any
answer he receives by specifying, explicitly or categori-
cally, the set of allowed possible answers. A third party
(X) brokers the transaction, holds money from Q and
A in escrow, and acts as arbiter. If A provides an an-
swer outside Q’s set of allowed possible answers, A loses
2money.
In many cases of practical interest, Q can be tasked
with determining the accuracy of A’s answer. If Q wants
to know what chemical matter binds to a particular tar-
get and A answers with a specific molecule, Q will even-
tually know whether A’s answer was right or wrong, and
Q can provide evidence to this effect to arbiter X. X
collects a deposit from Q at the beginning of the trans-
action, and X returns this deposit to Q when Q provides
sufficient evidence by a previously agreed upon date. Q
pays the same amount whether A’s answer turns out to
be right or wrong. X’s fee for brokering the transaction is
independent of whether A’s answer turns out to be right
or wrong and whether or not Q provides evidence X con-
siders sufficient. A has an explicit monetary incentive to
be accurate and an explicit monetary disincentive to pro-
vide information unless he is pretty sure he is correct. Q
has an explicit monetary incentive to ask a question that
will be directly useful to him, and for which he can even-
tually determine, with reasonable proof, the accuracy of
whatever answer A provides. X, as an ongoing business
interest, has a clear monetary incentive to thoughtfully
serve its role as a reasonable and objective adjudicator
of the evidence Q provides. Q, A, and X all have an
interest in ensuring Q’s question is carefully specified to
avoid subsequent ambiguities as to A’s correctness. This
transaction protocol enforces a set of incentives facilitat-
ing paid, arm’s length transfer of useful, bluntly honest
information from A to Q.
Using this transaction protocol, introduced for the first
time in Ref. [150] and implemented at Ref. [166], scien-
tists can sell what they learn from their research.
For convenience, we refer to this new ecosystem as cap-
italist science [167] [168] [169].
In capitalist science, A makes money only if he turns
out to be correct. A loses money if he turns out to be
wrong. Every transaction includes a monetary incentive
for Q to determine the accuracy of A’s answer and to back
this determination with evidence deemed sufficient by an
objective third party (X). These features directly address
socialist science’s reproducibility crisis. These incentives,
present in capitalist science, explicitly and directly re-
ward accuracy and penalize inaccuracy. The absence of
such explicit and direct incentives in socialist science is
the reason socialist science is suffering a reproducibility
crisis.
Capitalist science is the solution to socialist science’s
reproducibility crisis.
III. SUMMARY
Now that the solution to socialist science’s repro-
ducibility crisis has been found, we can roll up our sleeves
. . . sit back, relax, and let events unfold.
Socialist science will continue much as it has, produc-
ing results of similar quality. Serious, thoughtful, and
impassioned attempts will be made to save it. Some of
these may appear to work for a while, but ultimately they
will fail. The reproducibility crisis has been stewing for
decades [151–161]. The relevant malincentives are too
firmly embedded in its large and unwieldy ecosystem for
socialist science to produce a meaningful solution from
within.
The key to change is Q, the socialist science sucker
from Section I. Q is smart. Q is a socialist science sucker
only because socialist science fails to sufficiently discour-
age the publication of inaccurate information by failing
to hold A sufficiently accountable for being wrong. Q is a
socialist science sucker only because Q has had no other
option.
Q now has another option. Before launching a one
year, one million dollar research project motivated by a
result produced by socialist science, Q can spend ten days
and ten thousand dollars on a few questions to check it
out. Before investing ten million dollars on a new ma-
terials science innovation, venture capitalists can anony-
mously conduct due diligence with a convenience and at
a depth hitherto unimaginable. Relying on free infor-
mation of questionable accuracy produced by socialist
science can be very costly. Q is smart; Q is accustomed
to paying for things of value; and Q’s stakes are high.
Over time, Q increasingly relies on information ob-
tained from capitalist science, where A has skin in the
game. When A has truly valuable information, he finds
himself more interested in selling it than publishing it.
For less robust results, A is more inclined to publish,
avoiding the harsh penalty imposed by capitalist science
for providing information that turns out to be wrong.
Over time, useful, robust information slowly migrates to
capitalist science, where it is appropriately valued. So-
cialist science continues to publish the results A is willing
to give away for free.
The forces in capitalist science’s favor are so strong
that socialist science should be allowed to fade into ir-
relevance in its natural course [170]. Socialist science
has been a remarkable institution. The knowledge it has
provided has been extraordinary in power and in scope.
Its use of an incentive structure spurned by the most
developed of today’s modern economies only makes its
achievements all the more impressive.
We fully hope and expect socialist science will linger
among us for many years. At some deep level, the pur-
pose and goals of socialist science are fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of capitalist science. Capitalist sci-
ence is designed to facilitate useful, accurate information
transfer, and to provide A with a strong incentive to learn
information some Q will find valuable. Socialist science,
in contrast, is not.
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